Napoleon's Imperial Nobility

in #history6 years ago


I am impressed by nothing save success. - Napoleon

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As part of the French civil code Napoleon established in 1804, the imperial decree created a ‘new nobility’ on 11 March 1808,1 which was another step in equalising the levels of society Napoleon wished to have working together, and for him – rather than against him – and for the betterment of the Empire. There were to be no more privileges because of mere birth, nor governmental positions based on rank or birth given to unqualified people. These things would have to be earned, and no longer would feudalism be a system in France. If Napoleon was to be a successful ruler he needed to show the people of France that he would not allow the return of pre-revolution systems, and one measure was exerting control over aristocratic rights and functions, and have the aristocracy become more patriotically-focused instead of their more traditional divisive tendencies. With a focus on ‘imperial honour’ Napoleon sought to make the achievement of becoming a member of the ranks of nobility more accessible to a wider range of people, with the greatest emphasis on military - rather than political, artistic, scientific or administrative - honour, loyalty and skill.

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The Penthievre Family or The Cup of Chocolate, 1768 - by Jean Baptiste (or Joseph) Charpentier
(French nobility)
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Napoleon created three new titles in his 1808 decree – that of count, baron and chevalier – as part of his grand plan. In order for the nobility to be able to transmit their title by inheritance, as laid out by the new decree of March 1808 ‘… there was to be no nobility without wealth … a duke had to prove an income of 200,000 francs, a count of 30,000, a baron of 15,000, a chevalier of 3,000 …’2 It was instigated that these new inheritable hierarchy of titles have a majorat attached – if there wasn’t one available Napoleon created one out of special funding, his domaine extraordinaire. As a result of the new rules, the group dropped to ‘only a seventh’ of the size of the nobility before the revolution. The Empire was redefining the nobility, feudalism was disappearing, and titles were tied to State service. To Napoleon, it seemed “the only means of wholly uprooting the old”3 and creating nobility from those not previously associated with the class developed a ‘determined hostility towards the Old Régime’,4 thus ensuring the old system would not regain its previous place in the new society. In theory any citizen could be given a title, and apparently there were ‘enough famous cases of grocer’s or publican’s sons [becoming] dukes’5 to inspire hope amongst all male citizens, although it does not seem than any peasants ever reached any level of significance.

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"Napoleon having thrown his hat on the floor during the meeting in Dresden with Prince Metternich".
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An ideology of meritocracy was firmly held by Napoleon during his rule, as he believed that ‘…[t]he right to nobility was to rest on performance of public service …’6 and after being used to a system of inheritable title this may have taken some getting used to by the aristocracy. In part at least, what Napoleon was trying to create was a fresh start, with young men holding no great prior political history, ‘men relatively free of nostalgia for either the Ancien Regime or the Revolution’,7 placing men from differing social backgrounds together in the hope of equality across the sectors. Twenty two per cent of new nobility was garnered from the next generation of old nobility, as Napoleon sought fresh loyalty. Similarly, Napoleon blended the nobility and the bourgeoisie by creating a ‘prefectorial corps’ within the administrative body of France, which seemed to have worked well, as ‘[t]here [was] scarcely any evidence of class conflict or of real class interest. Bourgeois and noble prefects worked together in relative harmony.’8 Those who Napoleon picked to serve him came from a wide range of backgrounds, such as ‘old aristocracy, revolutionaries of ability, lawyers, members of the new clergy, army officers … diplomats, prefects, secretaries and clerks.’9 In return he ‘demanded honesty, hard-work, due deference to his own orders and a genuinely nationalistic spirit.’10

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Théophile Berlier
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For men such as Théophile Berlier, though, the bestowing of titles was an uncomfortable experience, after having been a part of the pro-revolutionary National Assembly and now being asked to accept titles they had sought to abolish so passionately. Berlier was one without the means of establishing the necessary majorat and so Napoleon came to his aid from the special fund, but Berlier was not comfortable with the new system: ‘”caught up in the general movement, I yielded to it, but without renouncing either the liberal ideas that remained compatible with the new institutions or my [previous] amicable relations.”’11 Théophile Berlier was likely not the only one to feel this way, so it may have been harder for the pro-revolutionaries to adapt to the new regime than the nobility did. They were more likely to have wanted a ‘clean sweep’ of all nobility holding any positions of power or influence in France. It must be to Napoleon’s credit that he was able to coerce, inspire or otherwise motivate people to follow his vision for their country.

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"Napoleon meeting with Goethe and Wieland. Photogravure
from a painting by Eugène Ernest Hillemacher"
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When Napoleon set about to blend the two societies – the nobility and the bourgeoisie – into one new united society, he called them the notables, and pushed people together who would not previously have generally mixed. It was in the military that the empire saw its greatest opportunity for developing this new society, and emphasised a new incentive for being a good citizen and model soldier – acquiring ‘honour’ – that is, ‘social virtue’ whereby people strived to invest in public welfare rather than personal welfare. ‘Napoleon was attempting to create an elite with a vested interest in the preservation of the Empire and the bonapartist dynasty …’12 As something that had only been seen as belonging, or being obtained by, the aristocratic members of society, honour was now promoted as being obtainable by any man of France, and for the good of France, especially from a military aspect. ‘’When the patrie, like a blessedly fruitful mother, is surrounded by a train of courageous citizens and upright men, it arouses fear, respect and admiration in foreign nations.’”13 A cohesive country was certainly a more notable adversary to outsiders. When a new titleholder was sworn in, part of their oath to the state included saying they would be ‘“faithful to the Emperor and his dynasty …, to raise my children in these same sentiments of fidelity and obedience, and to march to the defense of the Patrie every time the territory is threatened or His Majesty goes to war.”’14 Napoleon needed people willing to be soldiers in order to fulfill his plans to become a large empire by conquering other nations, and inspiring citizens to join up and fight would have been easier than having to conscript them.

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"Napoleon Receiving the Delegation from the Roman Senate
by Innocent-Louis Goubaud, 1809"
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Napoleon would have seen the upheaval of the old system as a perfect opportunity to instigate a newer – and to his mind superior – regime for France and all other lands he had – and would - set about conquering. Few aristocrats were in strong positions, with some still in exile, and many having experienced a sharp decline in wealth, power and land ownership; members of the aristocracy had already lost power during the Revolution, as much of their land had been either sold, appropriated or otherwise taken, and what they had left was largely far less productive than what they were previously working. They were also treated with suspicion by those who had supported the revolution and its ideals. They could not have returned to the old feudal system even if the new empire had allowed it. What Napoleon offered to many of them now was a new way of gaining – or regaining – at least some of the power they had previously known, but their power was more social than political. ‘As notables … they enjoyed social influence but no real political power …’,15 whereas before they would have been able to regularly attend the king’s court and possibly gain influence with the king. if they managed to gain entry into his ‘inner circle’. Napoleon, however, had no interest in the court pomp and splendour, and cut out most of the ceremonies traditionally shown to and by a ruler. Now, they ‘were fully expected to play their part in moulding docile and respectful imperial subjects. They were seen as a useful means of confirming Napoleonic hegemony’16 as Napoleon continued with his ambitious plans to dominate Continental Europe with his Grand Empire. In this he had great autonomy as all important decisions were his alone, rather than the administrative collective. Napoleon did not appoint a deputy for when he was out of the country on campaign, which made the smooth running of the country difficult. Napoleon ‘appointed the generals, he controlled the finances and, more importantly, he decided war and peace.’17 There were no state level checks and balances, especially as Napoleon hand-picked his officials, and ‘diplomats, officials, officers and members of court society were thus condemned to try and enlist the favour of the Emperor in order to maintain their position or gain new ones.’18 They were likely very frustrated that they had less autonomy under this new regime, than the old one they had fought so hard against.

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Napoleon and his young family.
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While Napoleon was partly successful in his changes, and did bestow a sense of patriotism with the creation of his ‘imperial honour’, and broke the hold that the feudal system had had in France for centuries, his desire for absolute control did not help cement all the changes he attempted to implement. He tried to assert his will over France and the greater Continental Europe almost single-handedly, leaving the elite men he surrounded himself with on the outside as glorified yes-men. He tried to oust the old nobility and bring into society new nobility, hoping they would be blank political canvases for him to mould, with his idealism of meritocracy. Napoleon also sought to meld various levels of society together, and in part at least was successful, with his creation of the notables and the prefects corps. Some members of the old National Assembly were not happy with how Napoleon was running the country, but tried to strike an internal balance between their own ideals and whatever their Emperor demanded. Napoleon’s ‘imperial honour’ did make nobility more accessible to a wider range of people but the system was not a balanced one, with his ability to pick and choose entrants unchecked. He could never really be sure that he was surrounded by men who were there for the right reasons, and there may never have been a great amount of trust from either side.

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Lieutenant Napoleon Bonaparte Aged 22
from the portrait by Jean Baptiste Greuse, in the Museum at Versailles
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This essay was one I wrote as an assignment, while obtaining my University degree. I have included the reference list and bibliography - reference materials I used while writing - just as I’d had to for its submission. It has never before been published anywhere public, though. Images have been added for visual interest.

References:
1 The Encyclopaedia Britannica: a dictionary of arts, sciences, and general literature. (1833). (9 ed. Vol. 5). Harvard University: C. Scribner's sons, pp. 747.

2 Bergeron, L. (1981). France under Napoleon (R. R. Palmer, Trans.): Princeton UP, pp. 68.

3 ibid., pp. 70.

4 ibid., pp. 70.

5 Englund, S. (2005). Napoleon: A Political Life: Harvard UP, pp. 301.

6 Bergeron, L. (1981). France under Napoleon (R. R. Palmer, Trans.): Princeton UP. pp. 69.

7 Dwyer, P. G. (Ed.). (2001). Napoleon and Europe. New York: Longman, pp. 73.

8 Whitcomb, E. A. (1974). Napoleon's Prefects. The American Historical Review, 79(4), pp. 1096.

9 Horricks, R. (1995). Napoleon's Elite (reprint ed.): Transaction Publishers, pp. 36.

10 ibid., pp. 36.

11 Dwyer, P. G. (Ed.). (2001). Napoleon and Europe. New York: Longman, pp. 72.

12 Lyons, M. (1994). Napoleon Bonaparte and the legacy of the French Revolution (revised ed. Vol. 1): Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 172.

13 Bertaud, J.-P. (1986). Napoleon's Officers. Past & Present(112), pp. 96.

14 Englund, S. (2005). Napoleon: A Political Life: Harvard UP, pp. 301.

15 Lyons, M. (1994). Napoleon Bonaparte and the legacy of the French Revolution (revised ed. Vol. 1): Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 161.

16 ibid., pp. 162.

17 Dwyer, P. G. (Ed.). (2001). Napoleon and Europe. New York: Longman, pp. 127.

18 ibid., pp. 127.

Bibliography:
The Encyclopaedia Britannica: A Dictionary of Arts, Sciences, and General Literature. Ed. Baynes, Thomas Spencer. 9 ed. Vol. 5. Harvard University: C. Scribner's sons, 1833. Print.

Beck, Thomas. "The French Revolution and the Nobility: A Reconsideration." Journal of Social History 15.2 (1981): 219-33. Print.

Bentley, Jerry H., Herbert F. Ziegler, and Heather E. Streets. Traditions & Encounters : A Brief Global History. Boston: McGraw Hill Higher Education, 2008. Print.

Bergeron, Louis. France under Napoleon. Trans. Palmer, R. R.: Princeton UP, 1981. Print.

Bertaud, Jean-Paul. "Napoleon's Officers." Past & Present.112 (1986): 91-111. Print.

Davies, Norman. Europe : A History. London: Pimlico, 1997. Print.

Dwyer, Philip G., ed. Napoleon and Europe. New York: Longman, 2001. Print.

Dwyer, Philip G., and Peter McPhee, eds. The French Revolution and Napoleon : A Sourcebook. London: Routledge, 2002. Print.

Englund, Steven. Napoleon: A Political Life. Harvard UP, 2005. Print.

Forster, Robert. "The Survival of the Nobility During the French Revolution." Past & Present.37 (1967): 71-86. Print.

Horricks, Raymond. Napoleon's Elite. reprint ed: Transaction Publishers, 1995. Print.

Lyons, Martyn. Napoleon Bonaparte and the Legacy of the French Revolution. European Studies. revised ed. Vol. 1: Palgrave Macmillan, 1994. Print.

Mansel, Philip. The Court of France, 1789-1830. 1st pbk. ed. Cambridge England New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991. Print.

Whitcomb, Edward A. "Napoleon's Prefects." The American Historical Review 79.4 (1974): 1089-118. Print.


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Thank you so much guys, this was an awesome surprise!

This is a very thorough research of Napoleon, properly referenced and sourced as well. Great post, raven! ^__^

Well done ravenruis, love your writing style! And congrats on the curie!

awwww shucks, thanks kindly!

I wish my tutors had liked my style more! lolol ;)

Meritocracia... Ahora suena mucho más perturbador! Muy buen artículo, amo a Napoleon

It was a fascinating time. Not so much for those living it, I'd imagine though, but for us to study it .. so much that went on. :)

Como dice el lema de Lampedusa: "que todo cambie, para que todo siga igual"

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