Steem Alliance proposals... time to vote!
The Steem Alliance working group has decided to treat the pre-registration as a 'test run' and opened voting on the foundation proposals to all Steemians. The vote is taking place on dpoll:
https://dpoll.xyz/detail/@steemalliance/steem-alliance-structure-proposal-election/
First I would like to extend a big thank you to @llfarms, @eonwarped, and @shadowspub for their dedication to working out the details for a proposal selection process with lots of criticism and little thanks. I already donated 100 SBI bonus units to @steemalliance to forward the objectives, but I'm donating another 25 each to these three to thank them for their efforts.
Image source: pixabay
Steem Alliance a Necessity
An effective foundation will be instrumental in helping Steem mature into a fully decentralized ecosystem with the strength to achieve 'mass adoption', bringing investors and developers that are committed to creating value for their user bases and creating products that have the potential to drive 'mass adoption'.
Evaluation Criteria
While foundation goals were not pre-established (each proposal can identify and include their own objectives), I am evaluating each proposal solely on whether I think it can effectively represent Steem to the world in a way that attracts investment and development. The key question I ask of each proposal will be "Do I think this proposal can achieve results?"
This question covers a lot of territory, as there are many pitfalls to be avoided. Does the proposal have effective governance? Does the design have adequate protections against corruption? Would the foundation inspire confidence in smart capital and startups, or would they see it as a giant red flag? Would the foundation be sufficiently representative to keep disparate interests of different Steem stakeholders in mind, or would it quickly become captive to whale interests (or worse, hijacked by parties motivated by politics more than by the stability and success of Steem?)
As I evaluate each proposal, I mean no criticism of any of the great Steemians that submitted the proposals. This isn't about personalities or ego, I just want to see results. I may not spot every weakness, and I might not identify every strength. I apologize in advance to all proposal creators if I missed the details that you think make your proposal uniquely amazing. I have only my own education and experience to draw from, and I make no claims to perfect knowledge.
The most common problem that I have seen in the proposal (and something that would need resolved immediately) is a failure to define 'Steemian'. Is it a person? Is it an account? This is a non-issue for stake-weighted votes (as covered aptly in the original Steem whitepaper) but as soon as you move away from stake-weighted you have to carefully define your terms -
This is the same issue I had with the @DolphinCouncil, which immediately disenfranchised me because I signed their charter from my personal 500 SP account instead of from a Dolphin account. So I'm not a dolphin even though my program is a 'hidden orca' with 52k SP split across 11 accounts? They offered to fix it, but only if I wrote the motion myself to put forward. DOA- why bother?
Prososals:
"Decentralized Steem Incubator" Submitted By @alexvan
My biggest concern for this proposal is the explicit choice to exclude USA as location of domicile. While foundation leaders may need to travel to represent to represent the foundation at industry conferences, the domicile for the foundation has no impact on those travel limitations. There is no reason the foundation has to be domiciled where the board can travel to.
A second concern is geographic representation. Geographic representation explicitly disenfranchises stakeholders from continents with stake concentrations. I appreciate that the election process is stake-weighted, but there is no reason to believe that all North American stakeholders would have similar concerns.
The foundation would be organized as a for-profit accelerator; providing funds to projects likely to achieve quick results and then turning those funds to additional projects... a snowball effect. To achieve success on this model, the board would need to develop particular skills and expertise, and the two-year term limits would mean that members are bounced just when they become fully proficient. There is no need to avoid potential dictatorship when the foundation will not have decision-making power over the blockchain, but only projects supported by it
Conclusion, I think this is an interesting model, but it would work better as an independent accelerator initially supported by the stakeholders that vote for it. It would be less likely to succeed as the 'official' foundation closely watched by many vocal Steemians - and more likely to succed as a fully independent project.
"DeCentraSteem" Submitted By @impactn
I love the focus on strengthening communities, as I think the existing strong communities are a unique asset that makes Steem stand tall above most other blockchains. The circles seem overly complicated. The review process to start/stop a circle is unclear. As explained, it looks like any cabal of 5 with 10k SP between them could bring any circle to a halt while a review is underway. Repeat this enough times and the 'circle' would just give up. (I control 50k+ SP across 15 accounts and could bring a circle to a working halt myself! Not that I would, but this illustrates how ineffective the model would be in practice.)
So while I like the objective, I think the inherent design makes the circles network least likely to succeed in attracting new investors/developers to Steem.
Conclusion: Great objectives, minimal probability of impact. Circles are so complicated and inefficient due to external review requests that I don't think this model would even be workable as a third-party project instead of as the representative foundation accepted by steemit and stake-weighted majority of Steemians.
"Foundation Structure Proposal" Submitted By @upheaver
https://github.com/pauliusuza/steem-alliance
Clear mission statement and vision, modeled after other successful foundations. Membership based with affordable memberships is typically a good model. I even considered joining the Bitcoin Foundation at one point, but I opted to buy more bitcoin instead.
The Chairman of the Board is given veto power, with too high a majority required for a vote of no-confidence. The chairman also has two votes for tie-breaking, which is completely irrelevant if they have veto power. This is my biggest concern, and the veto could be stripped with a supermajority amendment to the foundation design (if not removed before registration of the founding documents).
Board selected by members, with all key positions 'hired' by the board, with additional oversight from Board of Community Advisors. Adequate time is given for the board to act on proposals brought by the community, etc.
Conclusion:
Standard foundation design is more likely to be acknowledged/respected by new investors/developers, and foundation would have the authority/ability to hire whatever advisors and staff the board deems necessary to fulfill the objectives and mission statements. While still dependent on community support (Steemians need to actually join as members) this proposal has a high probability of 'success'.
"The Merger" Submitted By @shadowspub
https://steemit.com/foundationproposal/@shadowspub/foundation-proposal-the-merger
This proposal pushes all the right buttons for governance and oversight, and the stated objectives cover broad territory, it raises more questions than answers. The roadmap starts with gathering stakeholder opinions to establish voting mechanisms, etc. Isn't that where we are now? At what point do we 'pull the trigger' and actually take action?
I have utmost respect from the collaborators, as they have a proven ability to get results, but I think that at this stage in the Steem Alliance process we should be expecting a clear framework to get results, not just a promise of more discussion and consensus-building.
Conclusion:
I wanted to support this proposal because I believe in consensus-building, but I think we're at the point where we need to 'pull the trigger' and actually get something organized and funded, then continue with consensus-building within that established framework.
Still, I give this a moderate chance of success and I will vote for it alongside my top choice.
"People Survive By Supporting Each Other" Submitted by @TheHive
https://steemit.com/thealliance/@thehive/i-made-a-proposal
Waterfall of SP/VP flowing from supporters into core account and from core account into objective-oriented accounts. This is an intriguing proposal, but leaves most critical questions (governance, decision-making processes, oversight) unresolved. Even reading the links to earlier articles didn't really clear things up for me.
Funding only through reward pool is an implicit weakness and there need to be external funding sources, with appropriate oversight, for a representative foundation to succeed.
Conclusion:
Too confused to really estimate likelihood of success. Like the first couple proposals, I think this could have an impact as a separate project but doesn't have a clear enough structure to be the 'face of Steem' and fulfill my success criteria.
Summary
Thanks for taking the time to review my analysis. I don't know whether my arguments will sway anybody, and I definitely didn't go into as much depth on each one as I would like. If you made it even this far, you're a Steem hero!
Please review the proposals if you think you may disagree with my analysis. Take the time to form your own conclusions, post your own analysis, get out the vote!
The pre-registration only captured 3M SP of stake, and we need much better turnout for the final solution to be considered a representative solution.
At this point I think it's more important to have a 'face of Steem' that isn't Steemit, Inc than it is for that face to be governed by a process that I 100% agree with. I am voting based on perceived probability of success and even if a proposal that I didn't vote for wins, I will continue to support the foundation as the process moves forward.
Very good analysis. It actually put some of my thoughts into words. Your conclusions are even similar to mine.
You also found one more issue with merger I didn't think about (i goted for ut too because I like their collaborative spirit).
I differ on decentraland by impactin. It is definitely a wild card idea and problematic with the ability to ruin it built in. But there is a rule 9 which allows a two thirds majority to change rules. The issue of it not really having a structure remains. I don't see it as unfeasible i see it as needs improvement and a little more centralization. Different kinds of voting rights would solve it. Maybe 2 or 3 levels.
Posted using Partiko Android
Interesting thought. What exactly do you mean by 2 or 3 voting levels?
I think not all circles should have all voting permissions. Kinda like Steem and their keys divide it up. For example, a circle based on say Japanese curation should probably not be voting on economic decisions.
!dramatoken
I am highly entertained! I am happy to hear I can vote for multiple. I also resteemed this post because I believe it is important that people know to do this. I am making my final decisions now.
Any obstacle that has been voiced, A solution is there for in all of the proposals. I do agree that eventually more support than the initial delegation can provide is needed. I do think it is an essential part of the foundation structure to have it not owned.
Additional initial investment means returns from what is generated to promote the chain is lost.
A structure providing direct support to the chain by purchase of SBD/Steem from investment returns offers a greater stability to the chain.
Bringing investors to the chain at these stages can have a negative effect not only by the remuneration the community forming the foundation will have to provide. A greater difficulty to reach those target also occurs.
There is a limited amount of Steem produced daily, this is divided between all of the Steem powered up. A sudden influx of investment will reduce the rewards available to support new user retention.
By the addition of an external investment. The chain becomes a method of subsidising private industry.
Just a thought.
My biggest concern is that the proposal is too confusing. Imagine that a representative from Steem Alliance is pitching Steem at a blockchain conference:
One slide to introduce Steem, one slide to introduce the foundation, three slides to show why investors and developers should think Steem is the holy grail.
If you can't promote your blockchain as being the right solution in five slides, it's too complicated. I think it's fair to say that if I give up and resort to the shrug emoji then most potential investors will do the same.
I agree 100% about the urgency of bringing external resources into Steem ecosystem, I just think the proposed solution is too uniquely complicated to achieved the objectives.
That's why we need to work as a community. Bring the knowledge known by varied people to the table.
Any proposal implemented solely on what it has said without alteration in some manner will carry many faults that could of been eliminated prior to the foundation beginnings.
I do not think the foundation should be seen as Steem. It is an entity that represent the interests of the chain outside the interests of private entities. All company foundation. any entity looks out for its own survival. With the beginning starting from an investment that is not a "Chain" entity. Only leaves us rewarding the private entity and not the chain.
We only become reliant on others.
I will stop spamming your post. if you ever have free time, I am open to discuss these possibilities in a discord chat.
Thank you for detailed analysis.
You actually highlighted a small mistake in text of my proposal - chairman's veto power applies ONLY to simple majority decisions (1/2 vote) and can be overridden by supermajority (2/3 vote) - I have ve corrected it here.
Two of your statements stood out:
(In the body of the article)
(In the Comments)
My understanding of the mechanics here is not sophisticated enough to comment on the proposal. But I can comment on your work: thank you for trying to breathe life and longevity into this platform. You're kind of like a Steem doctor: you keep diagnosing and treating so the patient can enjoy a good productive life.
Thanks !
I'm now picturing a steampunk doctor with top hat, monocle, and a bag full of gear-driven medical devices...
Someday we will have the resources to field a dev team that actually pitches in at protocol level development. Maybe then I can be a real steempunk doctor instead of an armchair physician.
Advances are made by people with passion, and knowledge. You're bringing a chisel to what seems to be an obdurate, impenetrable entity. You keep working at it, making dents. Progress may not be in a straight line, but without people brainstorming about the system, there would be no movement at all.
already voted ! :)
thanks for sharing ! ♥♩♬♬
Posted using Partiko Android
곰돌이가 @bluengel님의 소중한 댓글에 $0.004을 보팅해서 $0.019을 살려드리고 가요. 곰돌이가 지금까지 총 4076번 $47.622을 보팅해서 $50.809을 구했습니다. @gomdory 곰도뤼~
고마운 곰도뤼~♥
Posted using Partiko Android
The Merger is meant to champion inclusiveness, community and ethics, all great keywords that we hoped to make pillars. We should have likely made it longer and with a more detailed explanation.
Thank you for taking the time to review and give your opinion on all the proposals.
I like the championing of inclusiveness and consensus-building, and it is one of the two that I'm voting for. Getting support from Steemit will be critical to the success of the foundation, but I think the next steps (and overall structure) actually gives Steemit with more permanent influence than they deserve and there isn't as much scope for immediate action (e.g. this is the structure, lets get it running now).
The general idea is that once the foundation is running and the starter board 'jump starts' it, the real board would be elected and initiate specific projects. All we really need to do is set them up for success. Steemit Inc is projected (or at least expected) to have a role where a lot of the tasks that they took upon themselves would be handed over. For any handover, there needs to be a mechanism and space. It's more about passing on knowledge and ensuring there's continuity.
Thank you for sharing your vision Joseph, of all the initiatives I see coming up, you have one of the most successful among users here.
My biggest concern right now is that the foundation has the ability to bring in external investment. What worried me most about all the proposals is that I could not see a history of this ability, even "The Merge".
Another thing that worries me, and that I have been thinking for some time, what steem has learned from other projects that are succeeding like bnb? We have good proposals at the table, I hope that the winner will be able to ratify the best for our blockchain. Thanks again for sharing, and all the best for all of us.
There is no history; whatever comes out of this will be something new. That's why I've focused on proposed structure and governance to ascertain an estimated probability of success.
Learning from other established successes is why my top choice was 'The Foundation Proposal', but I think 'The Merge' has decent potential too.
Thanks for your review and your valuable remarks. I'd like to comment by giving some answers and focussing on one fundamental difference between the "classical" foundation proposals and DeCentraSteem.
We weren't aware, the definition of "Steemian" could be something needing clarification. Within DeCentraSteem a Steemian is an identifiable person. Thus, you need five persons to set up a working circle, five persons to ask it to stop and if there is a vote head-count is applied. Why that?
The purpose is "strengthening communities". To do so, engagement of of a large number of community members is needed. While stake-based vote has its reasons for security of the blockchain, it seems to be the wrong choice to grow communities because communities are much more something like a village than a company.
Applying this, your reasoning that working circles could be stopped by a single malicious person, isn't really valid anymore. Apart from that, it might be important to clarify, that a working circle may only be stopped in its work by vote of the majority of active Steemians within all working-circles. Furthermore, it could be helpful to adjust the rule and put some deadlines in there. This is exactly what rule no 9 is aiming at: implementing an organised process of learning.
Finally , I'd like to point out to a major difference between trust-based and control-based types of organisation:
The setup of a classical foundation is driven by preventing unintended things to happen. As a result you have a lot of organisational overhead to still make the foundation work. Just have a look at the proposals: they focus on structure and not so much on those which are supposed to deliver content. As a result, most of these structures tend to be rather slow and not very innovative - maybe not in the beginning, but as soon as working processes become standardised.
DeCentraSteem follows another paradigm. It is an enabling structure, inviting as many people as possible to engage, leaving room for competition, debate and relying on a common purpose. Rules are not made to prevent things to happen but to help the organisation to focus on purpose and goals.
If there is one possible weak point, then it is the purpose. If many active people on Steem don't want to strengthen communities, a lot of malicious behaviour could occur, leading to meaningful effort to hedge it in.
Final remark: measuring proposals by the results to be expected corresponds to our thoughts as well.
In something moving as fast as the blockchain world a real flexible structure is needed to generate results. "Oldstyle"-foundations could be way too slow to keep up with the pace. There definitely is a trade-off between security against unintended results and fast adoption of new circumstances.
Who identifies what a person is? Is there an age restriction? How do you know each person actually controls the keys? I support many members of my family by helping them have a steem account. They are real people but I will be voting for many of them in votes like this.
A man with 4 children could stop any proposal/circle, even without any SP. In fact if I understand your proposal, that same man could stop every working circle.
Thank you for asking. Sorry, this is a misunderstanding. Only the whole community of active Steemians could stop a working circle by their vote, not a single group of five Steemians. Five can only get the process started.
Concerning identity: we should leave this to the "rules group" because it is a technical aspect: there are lots of methods for KYC out there and probably very soon we'll have some not being based on official identity documents - combine any of these with your account-name and you're registered.
A useful summary and analysis i think, although I'm a bit more of an idealist and less of a pragmatist than you.
What's this about a 'test run', is there another actual vote?
I'm really struggling with stake mattering more than people. It just feels like a massive affront to human dignity, then again maybe that's a good thing, may as well reflect the underlying truth of the platform's economics.
There was a pre-registration that was supposed to provide advance warning of the upcoming vote, and then only the preregistered voters would count at this stage.
The preregistration resulted in only a small number of accounts registering, so they working group decided that the actual vote should be opened to everyone. I called the preregistration a 'test run' and the actual vote is happening now (the dpoll link at the top of this post).
It's not that stake matters more than people. Stake-based consensus is a protocol-level solution to the byzantine generals problem (an attack vector that any trustless protocol must have a good answer for in order to be considered 'secure' and 'immutable'). The idea of stake as a consensus solution is that anyone with enough stake to influence the consensus will have more to gain from upholding the blockchain than they could potentially gain from sabotage. While less important when the consensus mechanism is a step removed (political discussion in an open forum, with decisions being reversible instead of immutable), it's still the backbone of over 100 years of shareholder rights law (1 share = 1 vote).
It's not a perfect system, but it provides a lot more resilience in a decentralized world than can be achieved with a 'permissioned' protocol. Counting people instead of stake requires 'oracles' to verify that each account has a unique pulse behind it; essentially making a permissioned blockchain instead of a truly decentralized blockchain. As seen with EOS, permissioned blockchains are terrible about maintaining immutability.
All potential technical solutions are subject to constraints, and the pros/cons depend on the actual objectives to be attained - what problem is this protocol actually trying to solve? One of struggles with Steem is that there are different perspectives on the actual objective, with key stakeholder groups unable to come to terms on what the purpose of Steem is.
If the objective is different than what is coded into the protocol, then it has to be solved at protocol-level, which requires establishing a new consensus among the top witnesses.
one of the objectives we, meaning the working group, had was to involve as much of the community with say as possible. In order to do that in a stake weighted environment it meant reducing the influence of the top level of the stake holders to give more of the other stakeholders say. As long as we hold SP, we are stakeholders, it's just a matter of how much influence that has.
Our solution was to put a cap on the upper stake with reduced influence beyond 250k SP... it has been interesting in the earlier stages to watch the changes in standings when switching between the full stake based and the modified. It was clear at that point our efforts were having the desired effect.
To go one account, one vote it means we then have to figure out ways to eliminate bots and sock puppets. It also opens the door for people being more inclined to voting based on the name(s) on the proposal. Some of the smaller accounts are not as invested (interest wise).
Yes I understand there's a cap after 250K SP and that all of this is done to prevent bots, i'm just saying it makes me feel uncomfortable.
I'm also convinced it's one of the main barriers to the mass adoption of steem. If I feel this disempowered with 11K SP, it's a feeling that's only going to be magnified for the 95% of people who have less of a stake than me.
There is a solution.... verified voting, it's either that or the effective disenfranchisement of 95% of users. There is a choice.
I do have some sympathy for the view that the more invested someone is the more of a say they should have, but that's 'cos I'm reasonably well invested.
It's just one of things on steem that I struggle with.