In November, Singapore's Land Transport Authority announced it will deploy metal detectors and X-ray machines at selected Mass Rapid Transit stations as part of enhanced security measures. Having seen these machines first-hand, I have found these 'security measures' wanting.

The above photograph was taken at Clarke Quay station. The fare gates at the station are arranged in a single line. The X-ray machine was located at one end; the other isn't covered.

This deployment shows that the X-ray machine and metal detector can't be deployed under regular circumstances. All you have to do to avoid being screened is to enter and exit by the fare gate furthest from the machine.

Not only that, the machines themselves were completely unguarded. Anyone could have walked up to them and tampered with them. A committed saboteur would dress himself in a set of overalls and arm himself with a toolbox, and then he can pass himself off as a technician sent to maintain the devices.

Nor is Clarke Quay an exception to the rule. Sengkang MRT station has multiple entrances spread across two floors. The X-ray machine and metal detector are sited in a nook by one of the lesser-trafficked entrances. Residents can go for months without noticing their presence.

On the day I spotted these machines, I noticed they were manned by a group of security personnel. Senior citizens in their fifties and sixties, all of them unarmed.

When facing armed and committed terrorists, unarmed security guards are just casualties.

War Gaming

Terrorists have one major advantage over security forces: they get to choose the time and place of the engagement. This advantage negates the capabilities the X-ray machines and metal detectors bring to bear.

At present, there simply aren't enough machines to cover every fare gate. If the machines were permanently activated and manned for day-to-day operations in their current positions and numbers, the easiest way to avoid detection is to take the gates furthest from the machines. If you do nothing to attract the suspicion of the station staff, you won't be flagged and taken to the machines.

The machines are only useful if they are switched on, and crowd control measures funnel passengers to them. If they are only periodically activated, it won't affect a terrorist's plans one bit. He'll simply wait until these enhanced security measures are lifted before striking. And if he's only passing through the area, he can easily leave the station and catch a bus or taxi.

Suppose these 'enhanced security measures' become permanent in the not-to-distant future. All passengers entering and leaving designated train stations must pass through security screening, like in an airport. There are metal detectors and X-ray machines near every set of fare gates, station crew diligently channel passengers using access barriers and cordons, and there is no way a regular person can avoid passing through the gates.

This will only change the target.

In this scenario, there will be a long queue of passengers outside the fare gates, as seen in the news article. These passengers will become the targets. A terrorist doesn't have to penetrate security to carry out an attack; he just needs to massacre a large number of innocents, and there is a ready-made crowd outside the fare gates.

A terrorist hell-bent on martyrdom will wait until it's his turn to pass through the scanner and strike. If you're lucky, he will simply pull out knives and stab everyone around him. If not, he'll detonate a suicide bomb.

I hope the police will deploy armed police officers to support the station security, because unarmed civilian security guards are not going to cut it in this scenario. Even so, understand that if a terrorist has committed to an attack and has joined the queue waiting to pass through security, it is already too late. There are no good options left.

Suicide bombs are becoming increasingly popular among terrorists. Not just suicide bombers either. Gunmen or knife-wielding terrorists can be equipped with suicide vests, to be detonated once they run out of ammo or are in danger of being captured or killed. The only reliable way to stop a terrorist is to shoot him in the face, repeatedly. Even so, there will usually be a secondary or even a tertiary detonator, such as a timer or a handler with a backup detonator. Dedicated terrorists will go one step further and sew or lock the suicide bomb on the designated martyr. This prevents the terrorist from backing out at the last second -- and delays the police from removing and defusing the device long enough for the backup detonator to initiate.

Once a terrorist infiltrates the queue of passengers, the only question is the final body count. A police officer must make repeated headshots against an aggressive, fast-moving target in the middle of a crowd. Doing this without hitting a civilian will be a difficult feat. If the terrorist is wearing a suicide bomb, expect the bomb to go off. Everyone within 25 metres will die.

The only difference the police can make is to prevent the bomber from blowing up a crowded train -- by ensuring he blows up the gates instead.

There is also a final alternative. If a terrorist believes a train station is a hard target, he'll simply attack somewhere else. A double-decker bus departing a bus interchange during rush hour, a crowded nightclub, anywhere but a train station. Thoroughly prepared terrorists always have a Plan B.

And there is nothing these 'enhanced security measures' can do about it.

Not If, But When

Not if, but when. The authorities are constantly harping this message. The next terrorist attack is treated not as a possibility, but as an inevitability. I understand where they're coming from, but these X-ray machines and metal detectors are security theater at best, and lull the public into a false sense of security at worst.

These machines are only effective if they are manned, turned on, and the station re-configured to funnel passengers into them. Even so, the resulting queues outside the security checkpoints will become tempting targets for terrorists. Terrorists don't have to attack a train if they can achieve similar results by attacking the crowds outside the gates.

Every good defence is layered. If the government insists on retaining these X-ray machines and metal detectors, then there must be armed police and sniffer dogs ready to intercept suspects before they reach the bottlenecks. Human guards should be trained to read body language and identify suspicious activity, and act on them. If they aren't doing this already, the police could go one step further and deploy plainclothes police to perform this role.

As the government has disarmed all citizens, you cannot count on ordinary people to help save the day. The best you can do is stay alert, report suspicious activity, carry medical supplies with you -- and obtain proper training.

The security forces have to be lucky all the time. Terrorists need only be lucky once. People cannot delegate their personal safety to the government. X-ray machines and metal detectors are only tools, not panaceas, and their presence may cause more problems. Do not allow yourself to be lulled into complacency; develop awareness and obtain the skills necessary to survive a critical incident.

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