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RE: OCDB and Downvotes | A #NewSteem approach

in #busy5 years ago (edited)

It would be irresponsible from our side and it would represent a conflict of interest if a stake distribution service downvotes posts that received bidbot votes... and since most of the posts trending are usually there thanks to other voting services, the management of deserves and what doesn't deserve to be on the trending page is up to the community

I would disagree with this. It is the responsibility of every stakeholder and by extension those to whom stakeholders have entrusted their voting power in the form of delegation, to see that the reward pool is used in a value-contributing manner and to take action with downvotes when it it is not, at the risk of seeing Steem fail. When large portions of the reward pool are allocated by bots/services, then those become just a subject to scrutiny and downvotes as anything else, in fact more so. It is not a conflict of interest to act against irresponsible usage, it is directly in the core interest of every Steemian to see that the reward pool is used well. And to be clear I believe that bidbots and other voting services are themselves perfectly fine, but like every tool they can be abused, and it is the responsibility of those with downvote power to step up and make sure that does not happen.

That being said, as long as the downvoting power is used for something useful, and voting circles are a perfectly fine case, then I don't see an actual problem. Not everyone can address every bit of abuse with limited downvotes.

But if and when we come to a time that all voting circles have been broken up and are no longer a problem (and hopefully this happens), yet hypothetically bidbots/services are still paying out large amounts far in access of value (particularly once the current excitement over downvoting bidbot abuse wears off a bit and participation in policing it may wane), then it won't be responsible for anyone with a large voting power to ignore this.

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I believe he meant to say we don't want to seem as if we want to damage the business of other bid bots on purpose for our own sake. The way the EIP already has changed the behavior to using bid bots and @ocdb as well in a very short time span is a very good sign for the future use of responsible and thoughtout bids from the services. Dare I say it almost seems difficult to find posts to downvote right now, I'm guessing they are figuring out other ways in smaller scales to abuse them.

At the same time @ocdb is not a "business" per se as it is nonprofit and while we try out best to mitigate abuse which usually does not happen often because users got on there through curation we'd right now at least prefer to find some "easier" posts to identify and downvote than to judge each bid botted trending post individually.

Dare I say it almost seems difficult to find posts to downvote right now,

Yeah, you're right about this. There is definitely a lot of value in looking for the more hidden abuses right now. I just don't think we can rule out that complacency sets in and it becomes harder to maintain momentum on healthy downvoting. I hope that doesn't happen but I fear it might.

we don't want to seem as if we want to damage the business of other bid bots on purpose for our own sake

Sure, but treating that as a blanket reason for all bidbots to never downvote the others even when they are out of line just becomes a damaging cartel. I don't think we want to encourage that. The focus should stay on whether particular cases (payouts) are appropriate to the content or not. You can almost ignore who voted for it entirely. Actually, that's a good way to entirely avoid the issue you stated: Make a policy not to look at all at who voted when deciding to downvote.

Yeah, I'm sure we'll get to a more mature stage where downvotes aren't taken as personal from both customers and bid bot owners over time. Luckily many of them seem to have adapted well to the EIP and are using their downvotes too, wish I could say the same about some others but maybe they'll also get there before they run dry from delegations or start some idiotic retaliations. There are still a lot of these cases like the one we are gonna focus on now, we'll take them one at a time and see how they react and respond and hopefully they'll see it as a positive change and adapt along with the rest of the community.

"...bidbots to never downvote the others even when they are out of line just becomes a damaging cartel."

This is precisely the scenario that I warned about pre-fork. With the curve changes it means that most smaller accounts actually NEED to boost their post to keep pace with previous post values. If we are also enabling a cartel of post boosters then STEEM will have become totally captured.

The former won't work. People keep making this prediction/claim/suggestion but it is really mathematically impossible. If most smaller accounts try to boost their posts they will end up blocking each other and driving the breakeven point higher. The reward pool is fixed size. Everyone can't be an "above average driver", to borrow an absurdity from the famous survey. It will always remain out of reach.

In addition, and by design, by boosting their posts higher in hopes of reaching some elusive break-even point, they make them more visible and attractive to downvotes. So, even if it could work, which it can't, it won't work in practice.

The latter is a bigger concern because it is at least mathematically possible. We will have to see how it works out, but from a starting point we should at least state clearly that it isn't socially desirable for that to happen and try to enlist agreement on that point. Yeah, I know we can't depend on that, but it can't hurt.

Just because it may be mathematically impossible if EVERYONE tries to do it, does not mean that some won't attempt to - even feel further incentivised to do so. It is the sort of situation where perception is reality and this comes down to understanding human psychology. It is game theory, not mathematics.

I know for a fact there are people who haven't used vote-selling services in the past but are now considering doing so to "stay ahead of the curve" (pun intended).

Some sort of consensus amongst whales, witnesses and vote-sellers about incentivising more vote-selling not being a "socially desirable" outcome would be good to see. I won't hold my breath ;)

does not mean that some won't attempt to - even feel further incentivised to do so.

Sure, and in raising up their posts they will make them more visible to potential downvoters. That's the purpose behind the curve. With some further evidence we might want to refine the parameters a bit but the fundamental idea is sound.

An author with a small payout might, in cases where the post is marginal, actually be better off leaving well enough alone and taking the smaller payout with less visibility.

Anyway, it doesn't really matter what happens in one particular case or another. What matters is that which becomes systemic, and my point about mathematical impossibility is that it isn't impossible for low-payouts to systemically escape the curve by buying votes. Some might, but only by volunteering to stand out from the crowd and be scrutinized.

I'd expect that most half-decent authors would want to stand out from the crowd and be scrutinised.

Sure. If you stand out and don't get downvoted, then you deserve the rewards. Even if you did pay for a vote or two to get noticed, it isn't that bad. Before long you will have your own followers, get resteemed, have regular voters, etc.

The curve offers lower(but still some) rewards to anyone without (much) scrutiny but if you move up the curve enough to get higher rewards, then it comes with scrutiny.

Hey! Smooth, budy, I understood that I was wrong! My apologies! Let`s be friends! No need to proceed please... Thank you! Regards, Profit Shooter

I totally agree with your first paragraph, it is the responsibility of everyone with stake (or delegated stake) to take action. The conflict of interest for us lies here: If we downvote a user who used any or several bidbot services, it may look as if we are trying to discourage users from using a specific bot instead of OCDB thus wrongly making us look like "unfair players engaging in dirty competition", when in reality we don't want to compete with anyone, just try and distribute stake in a fair way.

We are already seeing bots taking back their vote on abusive posts (including ocdb, we already took back some votes) and hopefully every bot will begin doing this so if/ when the scenario you mention in the third paragraph comes into play, we are not forced to take action. If it does happen, as you say, it will be on everyone's interest, including us, to dive into downvoting those posts.

Thanks for your input and as a major OCDB delegator backing the decision of downvoting circle voting farms.

Yeah I understand what you are saying about downvotes being used as a malicious competitive tool and I'm certainly not in favor of that. Anyway thanks for taking the initiative on this now as you have and I'm sure we will learn more going forward.

I would disagree too and I think that as the prominent issues are dealt with, it will need to be revisited. As you know, there is a fair way to go before that, though this has moved relatively fast considering the fork was only 4 or so days ago.

For now, I like that there is the focal point as having the scope makes it easier to target, and what they are targeting many others might avoid.

considering the fork was only 4 or so days ago

Yup. What really matters is how this all plays out over the next several months. The early changes are exciting but that's also a bit of a trap because once the excitement wears off then the real work begins.

It is a long-haul move and I am hoping that there is enough momentum that some decent active trails are set up for those who are uncertain about what they should do. People usually act on default and the default plays need to be in the best interest of the ecosystem.

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